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 1.  Introduction
To the extent that economic progress is driven by innovation, a good understanding of
what drives individuals and firms to invent new products and technologies is critical to
explaining growth and development.  In fact there is a broad literature employing
economic theory and empirical analysis to ask questions about the relationships between
innovation, market structure, and policies such as intellectual property rights (IPRs),
usually at the level of the firm or industry, or (occasionally) across countries (for a good
review see Dixon and Greenhalgh (2002).
There has been some work on the relationship between income inequality and innovation,
but much of this literature primarily deals with the effects of technological change on
wage inequality within an economy (see for example Mendez (2002), Aghion(2002),
Acemoglu(2000),  Huw (1999)).    Relatively fewer studies examine the reverse
relationship of the effect of population-wide inequality on innovation, although there is a
fair amount of literature that looks at the market structure (i.e. concentration) of industry
and its relation to innovation
1.
However a number of compelling arguments for the importance of population-wide
income inequality (as opposed to industry structure) for innovation come from two main
sources, namely the literature on the economic history of early U.S. industrialization and
the literature on the impact of institutional quality on long run growth.  In the former (see
for example Sokoloff (1988, 1992) and Sokoloff and Khan (1989)), a strong middle class
plays a direct role in spurring domestic innovation via two primary mechanisms; via the
demand for standardized manufactures and via the supply of large numbers of
economically active adults in close proximity to markets.  In the both the former and the
latter literatures (pioneered by Acemoglu et al. (2001)), inequality could play an indirect
role via its effect on institutional quality, including (perhaps) intellectual property rights.
                                                
1 Some exceptions are Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) who argue that innovation in production
requires large markets, and they emphasize the role of the agricultural sector in generating necessary
demand.  Zweimuller(2002) develops a theoretical model of innovation in which inequality has a role
through its impact on the structure of demand (unlike the standard Schumperterian growth model in which
consumers have homothetic preferences).3
While the existence of a broad middle class plays a central role in the Sokoloff story of
historical U.S. innovation, to these authors' knowledge the possibility that inequality
could play a role in the international evolution of innovation today has not been
examined.  This paper thus considers both role of a broad middle class in addition to
effective institutions (primarily IPRs) in spurring domestic innovation in a contemporary
cross section of countries.  In the process, we recognize that IPRs regimes, inequality,
growth and innovation are likely endogenous (see, for example, Sutton (1998), Acemoglu
et al (2002)), and address this possibility directly by using an instrumental variables
estimation strategy.  Thus the contribution of this paper is two-fold. Firstly we introduce
income inequality as a determinant of domestic innovation in a cross country context; and
second we explicitly address the possibility of endogeneity of IPRs, inequality, growth
and innovation in our empirical specification.
The paper proceeds as follows.  In section 2 we briefly review the literature on the role of
inequality on early U.S. industrialization and the evolution of institutions.  In section 3
we describe our data and outline the basic econometric method.  Section 4 discusses the
results and section 5 concludes.  Results and figures and a list of countries appear in
Appendix A.
2.  Brief Literature Review
To date most economic studies of modern innovation have focussed on the role of IPRs,
with little direct attention give the role of income inequality.  However there is both
direct and indirect evidence from other literatures that inequality might be a factor
explaining differential innovative activity across countries.  This evidence can broadly be
categorized into (a) evidence of income distribution's direct effect on innovation via both
demand and supply side effects; and (b) evidence of an indirect effect via the relationship
between inequality and institutional quality.   The most direct evidence comes from the
study of early US industrialization, while more indirect evidence comes from a new but
growing literature on the causal linkages between institutional quality and growth.4
Finally, all three of these literatures, on IPRs and innovation, on early US growth and on
the role of institutions emphasize the endogenous nature of institutional evolution,
income growth and innovation.
The literature on early US industrialization suggests relative income equality could effect
innovation via several channels.  From the demand side, Sokoloff and Khan (2000) and
Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) argue that the presence of a large middle class helped
spur innovation via their high demand for relatively inexpensive, mass produced
manufactured goods.  While low income people could not afford much non-essential
consumption and high income individuals tended to demand customized products and
services, the middle classes were oriented towards more standardized manufactures.  In
some sense this is a similar argument to the demand structure story of Zweimuller (2002),
but more nuanced with a focus on the incentives for innovation spawned by
standardization.   Sokoloff argues that much of the most fundamental advances in
technology during the nineteenth century were concerned with the production of
standardized manufacturing products.
On the supply side there are two channels through which a large middle class could
matter for innovation.  Sokoloff and Khan (1990, 2000)  note that innovative activities in
the US were widely dispersed across a population with a high degree of market
participation.  They cite evidence from US agriculture and manufacturing that suggest
this broad based market activity in turn led to wide participation in the patenting of
advances, based largely on incremental improvements on older technologies and
organizations. They comment on the “wide range of industries to which American
inventors had made technological contributions, the extraordinary creativity displayed in
lowering the costs of producing standardized goods, and the broad spectrum of the
population involved in inventive activity.” Sokoloff and Khan (2000 p. 2)
Finally, a large and economically active middle class also helped spur innovation via its
impact on institutional evolution.  Sokoloff (1988), Sokoloff and Khan (2000) and Kahn
(2002)  point out that mass economic and political participation led to early American5
IPRs that were significantly different from the prevailing European institutions.  In the
U.S.,  patenting was much simpler, less expensive and available to a much broader
spectrum of the population.  Thus the combination of a broad middle class and high
quality IPRs combined to provide the basis for unprecedented levels of innovation in
early American industrialization; “this close relationship between access to markets and
patenting is certainly consistent with the view that inventive activity was responsive to
material incentives as well as to the availability and security of property rights in
technology” (Sokoloff and Khan (2000) p.6)
Support for the idea that the presence of a broad middle class could play an indirect role
in determining innovative activity has come from the theoretical and empirical literature
on institutions and economic growth.   Theoretical models linking income inequality to
growth via its effect on the quality of institutions (albeit not explicitly IPR) include
Benabou (2000), Persson & Tabellini (1994), and Alesina & Rodrik (1994).  In addition,
recent literature on the relationship between initial natural endowments, European
settlement patterns and the subsequent evolution of both income inequality and quality of
institutions has emphasized the close link of these factors and their importance in
explaining income differentials across countries.  In particular, Engerman and Sokoloff
(1997, 2000) hypothesize that differing initial climactic and natural resource endowments
lead to differences in the ability to establish European settlements as well as agricultural
and extractive activities that differ in their ease of expropriation by political and
economic elites.  Areas that were naturally amenable to large-scale cash crops and/or
extractive activities based on low-skilled slave or native labor also tended to have (for
natural or political reasons) relatively low rates of European immigration.
Acemoglu et al. (2001) argues that these initial inequalities in wealth and human capital
between the European elite and the working class were exacerbated by the evolution of
institutions designed to protect the status of the upper class and facilitate the extraction of
rents.   In contrast, in areas where there was significant European settlement and
agriculture was smaller scale and more focused on staple foods such as wheat, broader6
political participation resulted in institutions to support private property and check the
power of the State.
The Engerman and Sokoloff and Acemoglu et al. studies all suggest that inequality is
intimately linked with the evolution of institutions, which in turn is an important
determinant of income.  Easterly (2002) and Chong & Gradstein (2004) make this link
more explicitly.  Easterly (2002) uses instrumental variables to show that a broad middle
share does have a positive effect on development, and that the mechanism through which
this effect takes place is through the effect inequality has on institutions. Chong &
Gradstein (2004) use granger causality analysis to empirically demonstrate dual causality
between income distribution and a variety of institutional quality measures.
Thus the literature suggests that income inequality could effect innovation via its effect
on demand for standardized manufactures, via the supply of savvy market participants,
and via its effect on institutional quality (and especially of IPRs).  At the same time,
however, a highly innovative community (for whatever reason) might in turn demand
higher quality IPR protection (see, for example, Sutton (1998)), might evolve in more
economically egalitarian fashion than more centralized systems, and might grow faster
(and thus be able to afford higher quality institutions and income redistribution).   The
possible endogeneity of these processes suggests we must take care in interpreting any
observed empirical correlation.
3. Data and Methodology
In this paper we propose to examine whether inequality and IPRs can help to explain
differential innovation rates across countries in the late 1990's.  For a measure of
innovation we use data on patents granted to resident and non-residents from 1994-2000
across a sample of 53 countries.   This provides us with a measure of significant
inventions that are new, and covers many countries over the time period in question.
Patent count data have been criticized on the several grounds.  Firstly, they measure the
output of innovation rather than the process itself.  However, this is true of all static7
measures of innovation that present snapshots at particular points in time in the creative
process.  Patent counts may also potentially be a downwardly biased measure of
innovation: for example, firms may apply for patents only if they believe that the benefits
of patent protection outweigh the costs, certain areas may not have adequate patent
protection, inventions may be protected by other methods such as trade secrets etc.  These
issues can be quite significant at the firm level and may create heterogeneity in firm
patenting behavior.
At the highly aggregated national level, however, it is perhaps more reasonable to hope
that (resident) patenting will be correlated with inventive activity overall and thus provide
an adequate proxy for country-wide innovation.  Not only will the firm and industry-level
heterogeneity be smoothed, but the fact that a substantial number of countries in our
sample are signatories to the patent treaties suggests that the criteria for obtaining a patent
are converging.   Table 4 indicates which of the countries in the sample were signatories
to the Paris Convention for Protection of Industrial Property and the Patent Cooperation
in 1994 (for those that became so after 1994 the year of ascension is noted).  Out of 53
countries only 11 remained outside the treaty during the sample period.  We include a
dummy variable for membership in the Paris treaty in 1994 in our analysis (which makes
a significant difference only to the results regarding non-resident patents) and argue that
although clearly imperfect, our relatively current measure of patent counts (averaged
across 6 years) is likely to capture cross country differences in innovation.  This was also
the conclusion reached by Griliches (1995) who suggests that “… patents appear to be a
good indicator… for inventive  activity...[only] at a very aggregated level.”
In any case, while we have in the back of our minds that our (resident) patent counts are a
proxy for innovation (and throughout the remainder of the paper tend to use these terms
interchangeably), it must be kept in mind that actually what we are examining are patents.
We test whether strong IPRs have a positive effect on patenting, and whether this is a
specific effect of IPRs or just a proxy for good institutions more generally.  Since high
rates of innovative activity could itself lead to better institutions, we assess the exogenous
contribution of IPRs to patenting by instrumenting for IPRs using a set of structural and8
geographic instruments that are (arguably) exogenous, or at least more exogenous than
institutions themselves.
If inequality effects patenting via its effects on institutional (IPRs) quality, then there
should be no significant effect in a regression of patenting on inequality once we control
for quality of IPRs.  However as we have discussed, a greater middle class share could
also have direct effects independent of IPRs both through the increase in market
participants who might be inspired to innovate, as well as through demand structure
effects. It is reasonable to expect that these latter two direct mechanisms would have
differential effects on resident and non-resident innovative activity.  In particular, if the
channel is through increased market participation then we would expect an increase
domestic innovation (i.e. resident patenting), but not necessarily non-resident innovation.
On the other hand, if the channel is through the demand structure then there could be
incentives for both resident and non-resident innovators to file patents domestically.
These particular underlying theoretical mechanisms through which inequality, institutions
and innovation could be linked are deeply structural and historical; it would be surprising
to find that year-on-year changes in inequality would have an impact on patenting rates,
for example.   In any case, there is substantial evidence that within-country inequality
(and particularly middle class share) tends to be highly persistent over time (Deininger
and Squire (1996), Quah (2001), Easterly (2002)), with some studies suggesting that this
stability extends back as far as several hundred years in some cases (i.e.  Lindert (2000),
Lindert and Williamson (2001)).
Furthermore, although in theory IPRs can be adapted quickly over time, our data shows
that in practice changes occur very slowly. Any IPR regime is necessarily embedded in
the larger society and subject to influences of greater institutional quality issues such as
rule of law and independence of the judiciary.  In as much as there is significant path
dependency in these broader institutional factors (as is strongly suggested by Acemoglu
et al. and the literature cited above), it is not surprising that the year-by-year effects of9
changes in IPRs are difficult to detect at the macroeconomic level over a relatively short
period of time.
Thus the approach we adopt here is to examine how variation in the level of inequality
and IPRs can explain variation in levels of resident and non-resident patenting across
countries.    This has both advantages and disadvantages.  One disadvantage, as with any
cross sectional analyses, is that there is increased scope for omitted variable bias driving
the results.  Any country-specific factors that are correlated with our variables of interest
and that are not explicitly controlled for in the regression could be a problem.
On the other hand, our primary research question asks whether exogenous differences in
initial conditions across countries can, via their effects on inequality and institutions,
explain differential rates of innovation (as proxied by patenting rates).  In this sense, the
cross sectional analysis is actually more closely aligned with our theoretical question than
would be a panel or time series estimation.  Furthermore, our instruments for institutional
quality are based on exogenous geographic and historical characteristics of countries that
do not change over time. Thus we are able to discern only the deeper underlying
differences in institutional quality across countries but cannot explain variations in year-
by-year changes within a given country.  For these reasons we feel a cross section
specification is not only necessary but also adequate for the purposes of this paper.
Drawing on the literature on innovation discussed above, our basic specification is a cross
section regression that takes the general form:
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Where our proxy for innovation is the natural log of the average number of resident and
non-resident patents over the period 1994-2000 and X denotes a set of k control variables.10
The index of IPR, or patent protection, is patave90 is from Ginarte and Parks (1998) and
is based on an analysis of national patent laws.  The overall composite index ranges
between zero and five with higher values signifying greater patent protection
2.  While this
index captures a broader range of characteristics regarding the variability in patent
protection across countries than a simpler dummy variable approach (for example see
Ferrrantino (1993) and Maskus and Penubarti (1995)), it may still be subject to
measurement error. Gaps between measured and actual levels of protection could result
from slow enforcement, industrial targeting, trade policies, etc.   As there is a lag time
between innovation and patenting, and as an additional control on endogeneity, we use
the index value from 1990.
For inequality we use a measure of middle class share (midclass) from Deinenger and
Squire (1996).  Both the analyses of Sokoloff and the work of Easterly suggest that
middle class share is the most appropriate measure of inequality for our purposes.
Our measure of general institutional quality (inst96) is an index, the average of two other
indices on regulatory quality and the rule of law from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi
(2003).  These indices are increasingly common in the literature to measure institutional
quality and we adopt their measures for the year 1996.  In an earlier version of this paper
we used a measure of risk of expropriation from La Porta et. al. that was used in the
Acemoglu (2001) and subsequent papers.  However the use of this previous variable
limited our sample size considerably without providing any extra explanatory power.
We additionally control for a number of other variables that have been theoretically
linked in the literature to patents. In particular we control for:
•  Log of real GDP per capita in 1980 (Lgdp80): Much of the work of Acemoglu et al.
concerns the role of institutional quality in explaining broad differences in income per
capita across countries.  By controlling for “initial” income differentials, then, we will
                                                
2 It is obtained by aggregating across five categories reflecting country specific characteristics of IPRs, each
of which takes values between zero and one. The five categories are: coverage; membership in international
patent agreements; provisions regarding loss of protection; enforcement mechanisms; and duration of
protection. The analysis by Ginarte and Parks indicates that the ranking of countries by this index is not
sensitive to the weighting scheme used.11
also control for much of the exogenous (and endogenous) variation in general
institutional quality.  This variable could arguably be considered endogenous itself,
however, so we will instrument for it in the analysis. Source: World Development
Indicators
•  Log of total population in 1990 (Lpop90): note that if the coefficient on this variable
is significantly greater than one it would suggest increasing returns in line with some
endogenous growth theories.  Source: World Development Indicators
•  Log of  average years of schooling of adult (25+ yrs) population from 1960 to 1990
(Lschool):  Basic endogenous growth theory would predict that countries with greater
human capital would innovate more.  Also, educational outcomes could be considered
to jointly evolve with institutional quality, and thus leaving this variable out might
attribute to our institutional variables some effect that is more fundamentally a
function of education.  Source: Barro and Lee (1996)
•  Share of population in urban areas in 1980 (Urbsh80):  Urban share could be quite
correlated with middle class share but operate on innovation in distinct ways. For
example a highly urbanized population provides much cheaper transport costs to
markets, which can have an effect on innovation independently from the effects of
inequality discussed above.  Again, in the broad scheme of things this variable might
also be endogenous (although certain exogenous geographic and historical
characteristics are also likely to play a large role).  Source: World Development
Indicators.
•  Openness to trade (Frankrom):  The literature on innovation and IPRs has stressed
the role of openness in this relationship.  In contrast to protected markets, under an
open trade regime there is greater competition, and hence greater incentive to invest
in R&D and innovate in order to remain competitive.
3   However, trade policy itself
could be endogenous with innovation and hence we use a measure of “natural”
openness from Frankel and Romer in which trade volumes are modeled in a gravity
equation as functions only of exogenous population and geographic characteristics.
Source: Frankel and Romer (1999)
•   Small = Dummy for small country area
•  Oecd = Dummy for country member of OECD pre-1993 (except Turkey)
•  Latam = Dummy for Latin American country
•  Africa = Dummy for African country
•  Tiger = Dummy for East Asian “tiger” country
•  Paris = Dummy for signatory to the Paris Convention for Protection of Industrial
Property and the Patent Cooperation in 1994
Other variables that we use as instruments for the endogenous variables are:
                                                
3 Krueger (1978), Bhagwati (1978), World Bank (1987), Edwards (1992).12
•  Distance from equator in degrees (Latitude)
•  Dummy variable for British origin of legal system (legor_uk)
•  Percentage of the population in 1980 in each country that are Protestant (prot80)
•  Log of country area (larea)
•  Population concentration (Hhi):  Herfindahl index of concentration of the population.
•  Dummy variable for landlocked country (landlock)
4. Discussion of Results
4a.  Resident Patents
In table 1 we present our results estimating equation (1) for resident patents.  Columns 1
and 2 present standard OLS regressions, while (3), (4) and (5) instrument for our four
possibly endogenous variables: Patave90, midclass, inst96 and lgdp80.  Several things
are worthy of note here.  First, in regressions 1 and 2 our measure of IPRs (patave90) has
the expected positive sign and is statistically significant (but could be endogenous).
Figure 1 illustrates that this relationship is a general one in this sample and not driven by
outliers or a small subset of countries.    However, our measure of general institutional
quality is not statistically significant and is even negative (illustrated again in Figure 5).
In a previous version of this paper an alternative measure of general institutional quality
(risk of expropriation used in Acemoglu et. al. (2001)) was also statistically insignificant.
Thus we interpret this as a sign that the importance of IPR for innovation is not simply as
a proxy for good overall institutional environment.  Finally, as expected the level of
initial wealth has strong explanatory power (but is probably endogenous), as is illustrated
in Figure 2.
Perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this paper, middle class share (midclass)
also has a positive and significant effect, even controlling for IPRs.  Thus, this result
taken at face value would suggest that inequality plays a direct role in explaining
innovation and not just through its effects on institutions.  Figure 3 illustrates that this
also could be interpreted as a general relation in the sample and not the result of outliers,13
although the clustering in the center suggests that this result could be sensitive to sample
selection
4 .   In addition this could be due to endogeneity.
It is interesting to note in regression (1) that our variable for openness (frankrom) is not
statistically significant, contrary to the expectations of the literature.  Figure 4 illustrates
that this is also a general outcome; there really is no discernable relationship between
openness and patent rates in this sample.   Finally, the coefficient on population is
slightly greater than one (but this is not robust), while the schooling variable is also
positive and significant.  Membership (in 1994) in the Paris treaty is not significant,
however. Nor is urban share, and nor are several of our regional dummies, so these
insignificant variables are dropped in subsequent regressions to save degrees of freedom.
In regression (2) we drop the insignificant variables but the primary results remain robust.
However, in all the regressions (1) and (2) there is a large potential endogeneity problem.
As discussed above, we suspect possible endogeneity with our IPR measure, our
inequality measure, our institutional quality measure and the level of GDP.  To address
this concern in regressions (3) and (4) we instrument for all of these variables using a set
of arguably exogenous geographic variables such as latitude, area, landlocked, population
concentration, English legal system, and protestant percentage.  We take advantage of the
fact that frankrom and several of our regional dummies were not significant in (1) to
include these in our instrument set as well.   We achieve respectable first stage R-squared
measures (reported below table 1) and the instruments pass standard overidentifying chi-
squared tests (also reported in table 1).  Nevertheless the small sample size of 53
countries remains a problem for putting too much reliance on IVE as a form of
estimation; we present these results as suggestive only.
In both the IVE regressions (3) and (4) our IPR variable is positive but has lost statistical
significance (with a p-value of around .17).  Whether this is due to a small sample size
and poor instruments or by substantial reverse causality is impossible to say from this
                                                
4 Indeed, in an earlier version of this paper when our sample was restricted to only 28 (mostly developing)
countries by the inclusion of Acemoglu et al's colonial mortality and risk of expropriation variables, our14
analysis alone,  however the large theoretical and empirical literature on the effects of
IPR on innovation suggest the first culprit is most likely.  Another possibility is that the
true causal effect of IPR is being usurped by our middle class share variable.  In any case,
the results suggest that further empirical work on the relationship between IPR and
innovation should take the possibility of endogeneity seriously.
General institutional quality remains statistically insignificant in IVE regression (3), but
perhaps our two institutional variables are collinear enough to be making it difficult to
discern their independent effects.  Thus in IVE regression (4) we drop our institutional
quality variable, Inst96.  Middle class share remains positive and highly significant.
However the coefficient of the IPR variable hardly changes, nor does its level of
significance.
Finally, in regression (5) we explore the possibility raised above that perhaps our IPR
measure and middle class variable are highly correlated.  This could be because there is
not enough unique variation in the instrumental variables to clearly identify the two
effects, and for whatever reason middle class share has come out the winner.  In fact,
when we drop middle class share our IPR variable once again becomes quite statistically
significant and of a larger magnitude than before.  However our instruments are not as
good now, as the chi-squared tests fail to reject the over-identifying restrictions by a
fairly meager magnitude.  This likely reflects the findings from Easterly (2002) that
middle class share is itself related to underlying geographic features, so those variables
make less satisfactory instruments when middle class share is excluded.  However it is a
bit daring to speculate on this with so few observations; we again leave the results as
suggestive.
Taking these results at face value suggests that the role income equality is playing is
direct and causal.  However, we cannot yet distinguish between the demand effects and
supply effects described above.  In summary, our analysis lends support to the idea that
the role of the middle class is important determinants of domestic innovation, as proxied
                                                                                                                                                
results on middle class share lost statistical significance15
by resident patents, in countries today.  In particular, we find that inequality plays a direct
role in explaining innovation and not just through its effects on institutions.
4b. Non-Resident Patents
We then consider both the role of a broad middle class as well as that of effective IPRs on
non-resident patents.  Much of the literature survey and discussion of underlying
determinants of innovation and patenting apply primarily to domestic innovation and
resident patents; we would not necessarily expect the same patterns to hold for non-
resident patents (the reasons motivating foreigners to patent in a given country could be
quite different from those we have discussed).  If middle class share effects patenting via
its effect on demand structure and returns to innovation, then it should influence non-
resident patents as well as resident patents.  However if the association has more to do
with broad participation in economic life we would expect it only to be a factor
influencing only resident patents.  In addition, while we did not find openness to be
significant in explaining domestic innovation, there are a number of reasons why it might
play a larger role in explaining non-resident patents.
In table 2, column (6) we present an OLS regression explaining log of average non-
resident patents and find that the drivers in this case are very different from those in the
case of resident patents.  In particular neither middle class share nor IPRs is significant in
explaining non-resident patents.   Neither schooling nor GDP per capita are significant.
However, in direct contrast to the results for resident patents, in this case openness is
positive and significant, as is being a signatory to the Paris treaty in 1994.  Figure 6
illustrates that again the relationship between openness and non-resident patents is not
driven by outliers.  In fact, one might expect more naturally open countries to be more
likely to sign the Paris treaty earlier and indeed when we drop the Paris variable, our
openness variable becomes even more statistically significant (not reported).  In sum, the
variables providing the most explanatory power for non-resident patent rates across
countries are openness, urban share of population, membership of the Paris treaty, and
being an OECD or Asian Tiger country.  This is consistent with the idea that foreign16
firms are patenting in countries in which they have investments or intend to invest in and
which are more open to foreign trade and international IPR treaties.
5 Overall, the
evidence suggests that non-resident patenting patterns are driven by relatively exogenous
features and not by the kinds of internal, institutional factors that drive domestic
innovation.
In regression (7) we re-estimate the equation using IVE, and this time drop the
(insignificant) institutional quality and middle class variables to see if, as with resident
patents, the significance of the IPR variable, patind90, will change.  Even with IVE we
find these variables are not statistically significant and the results basically mirror those
from the OLS regression.  Other IVE regressions suggest that these results are robust to a
number of different specifications (not reported).
The finding that middle class share explains resident, but not non-resident patents, is
interesting for several reasons.  First, taken at face value it suggests that that the direct
mechanism through which income equality effects innovation is via broad participation in
markets and perhaps Furthermore, the results from table (2) suggest that the effects of
middle class share and IPRs on resident patents from table 1 are not likely to be due to
spurious correlation with country fixed effects.  If we were simply picking up omitted
variables associated with general high-patenting countries, then we might have expected
to pick up the same effects when modeling non-resident patents.  The fact that we find
the middle class share having explanatory power in the case of resident patterns of
patenting, but not non-resident patterns of patenting is reassuring and is consistent with a
Sokoloff-type story of domestic innovation.
4c. Robustness checks: US patents filed by foreigners
In order to check the robustness of the results outlined above to alternative measures of
innovation we turn to data on foreign patents filed in the U.S.  This measure has some
advantages and some disadvantages over the national patent data we used in 4a and 4b.
                                                
5 Some studies indicate that most FDI is disproportionately allocated to a few countries.17
One advantage is that all patents are subjected to the same regulations and level of
scrutiny, so individual country effects in that regard are no longer a factor.  A potential
disadvantage is that it measures only patents filed in the U.S.   Insomuch as this
procedure could vary in difficulty from country to country a new set of country-specific
issues could be brought into play.  Furthermore, this may not be as precise a measure of
national innovation as it is a measure of global market-orientation. Finally, in using this
measure we lose four observations from our data set (including the US).  Nevertheless it
makes for a reasonable robustness check on the primary findings.
The results are presented in table 3.   In regression (8) we include all the regressors used
in the previous analysis and find that apart from initial GDP, nothing is statistically
significant.  We then pare down the number of variables, omitting those with the lowest t-
statistics.  The result of this reduction process is presented in column (9).   Although both
take positive signs, neither of our institutional variables are significant.  Middle class
share is positive and marginally significant at 10%. We then explore whether our
institutional measures could be capturing more or less the same thing, and drop our
measure of general institutional quality.  In regression (10), controlling only for IPR for
institutions we find that IPR is now significant (albeit only at 10%) and now middle class
share more convincingly so (at 5%).
Our attempts to explain foreign national patenting in the U.S. falls somewhere in between
our regressions of resident patents and those of non-resident patents. Certain structural
and institutional variables do seem to play more of a role determining patents filed in the
US than determining non-resident patents, but less of a role than for explaining resident
patents.18
5.  Conclusions and Discussion
This paper examined whether the presence of a well-developed middle class and effective
IPRs are as relevant today as factors spurring domestic innovation across countries as
they were during the early stages of industrialization in the U.S.   While there has been a
considerable literature reviewing the latter question from both theoretical and empirical
perspectives, we have taken a slightly different approach from (to these authors'
knowledge) other papers.
In particular, for the case of IPRs and innovation we are concerned whether the positive
observed correlation between strong IPR's and innovation might be due to either
endogeneity or omitted variable bias.  In the first case it could be that particularly
innovative countries (for whatever reason) have a bigger incentive to enact stronger IPRs.
In the second case perhaps the correlation is simply picking up the effects of good quality
institutions generally, of which IPR's are just one component.  We address these concerns
by both instrumenting for strength of IPR and controlling for general institutional quality.
We find some evidence that exogenous variation in IPR has predictive power for
innovation and thus at least some of the causality in that relationship runs from IPR's to
innovation.  However when we control for middle class share, the significance of this
relationship is greatly reduced (p-value=.17), casting some doubt on our ability to
adequately instrument for all these variables with such a small data set and so few
uniquely varying instrumental variables.  The results are thus suggestive and call for
further empirical work to look into this relationship.
In the case of income distribution, this is the first paper to the authors' knowledge that
empirically introduces middle class share as a possible explanatory factor in the variation
in innovation across countries today.   To date most, if not all, of the evidence that
suggests inequality might play a role comes from primarily from US economic history
and secondarily from the institutions and growth literature.  These suggest that inequality
could have an effect on innovation either indirectly via its effects on institutional quality
(including IPRs) or directly via market participation and demand effects (the US
historical story).19
Thus while there are several plausible mechanisms through which inequality could be
related to innovation, we would expect that the two more direct mechanisms
(participation and structure of market demand) would have differential effects on resident
and non-resident innovation and patenting activity.  In particular, if the channel is
through increased market participation, then we would expect this to increase domestic
innovation, but not necessarily non-resident patenting.  On the other hand, if the channel
is through demand structure then there could be incentives for both resident and non-
resident innovators to file patents domestically.
Our results indicate that the size of the middle class and, to some extent, IPRs explain
resident patterns of patenting, but not non-resident patterns of patenting in a modern cross
section of countries.  These results are robust to controlling for quality of institutions and
instrumenting for endogeneity.  Thus our results are consistent with the general Sokoloff
story from US economic history that income inequality is plays a direct role in domestic
innovation via a broader market participation of the population.  On the other hand, the
evidence suggests that non-resident patenting patterns are driven by relatively exogenous
features and degree of global integration rather than by the kinds of internal, institutional
factors that drive domestic innovation.
The analysis is based on a basic cross country regression design and the sample of
countries is inherently limited by the data available; certainly more research along these
lines is necessary.  Given these constraints, however, exploring the role of a broad middle
class in spurring innovation, and carefully controlling for possible endogeneity in the
relationships between growth, innovation, IPR institutions and income distribution seems
to be a promising channel for future research.20
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APPENDIX A
Table 1:   Dependent Variable = Log of Average Resident Patents, 1994-2000
(robust t-statistics in parentheses)































































































No. Obs. 53 53 53 53 53




p= 0.6408 p=0.5850 p=0.1697
*Notes on IVE:
•  instruments: hhi, larea, latitude, legor_uk, prot80, frankrom, oecd, latam, urbsh80, landlock
•  Endogenous Variables instrumented (1
st stage R-sq from (3)): patave90 (.7839), inst96
(.8898), midclass (.6836), lgdp80 (.9214)Table 2:  Dependent Variable = Log of
Average Non-Resident Patents,
1994-2000
(robust t-statistics in parentheses)





















































No. Obs.   53       53
R-squared .9442         .8959
Sargan Over-id                    .7090
Table 3: Dependent Variable = Log of
Average US patents filed by Foreigners,
1994-2000
(robust t-statistics in parentheses)

























































No. Obs.  49         49              49
R-squared 0.8372        0.8721         0.8517
Sargan Over-id  0.4443        0.7245         0.758325
Figure 1: Partial Correlation Between

























-1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1
e( patave90 | X )
coef = .85625268, (robust) se = .23470658, t = 3.65
Figure 2: Partial Correlation between


























-1 -.5 0 .5 1
e( lgdp80 | X )
coef = 1.6015271, (robust) se = .3065242, t = 5.22
Figure 3: Partial Correlation between



























-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
e( midcall | X )
coef = 5.4400356, (robust) se = 1.5417141, t = 3.53
Figure 4: Partial Correlation between
Resident Patents and Natural Openness
Figure 5: Partial Correlation between

























-1 -.5 0 .5 1
e( inst96 | X )
coef = -.58616286, (robust) se = .46212897, t = -1.27
Figure 6: Partial Correlation between
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ARG 1 JAM 0
AUS 1 JPN 1
AUT 1 KOR 1
BEL 1 LKA 1
BGD 1 MEX 1
BOL 1 MYS 1
BRA 1 NIC 0
CAN 1 NLD 1
CHE 1 NOR 1
CHL 1 NPL 0
COL 1 NZL 1
CRI 0 PAK 0
DNK 1 PER 0
ECU 0 PHL 1
ESP 1 POL 1
FIN 1 PRT 1
FRA 1 SLV 1
GBR 1 SWE 1
GHA 1 THA 0
GRC 1 TTO 1
GTM 0 TUR 1
HND 1 UGA 1
HUN 1 USA 1
IND 0 VEN 0
IRL 1 ZMB 1
ISR 1 ZWE 1
ITA 1